Page 346 - Demo

%uad6d%ubbfc%uad8c%uc775%uc704 %ud559%uc220%uc9c0 %u300c%uad8c%uc775%u300d346 Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights CommissionAbstractStructural Limitations and Improvement Measures of the Public Interest Reporting Protection System for Illegal Orders within the Military:Focusing on the Perspectives of%u201cCriminalization%u201d and %u201cOrganized Complicity%u201d%u2759 Kim, ChanghwanPhD Candidate, Chung-Ang UniversityThis study analyzes the structural conditions under which unlawful orders arise, are issued, and are executed in the Korean military, as well as the effectiveness of the public-interest whistleblowing protection system in response, examining norms, precedents, and case studies. It focuses on the normative tension between the concept of %u201cjustifiable orders%u201d in the Military Criminal Act and the general obligation to obey in the Basic Military Service Act, as well as the reality that the burden of determining %u201cclear illegality%u201d is concentrated on subordinates in the field. The research methodologies consisted of a literature analysis (statutes, subordinate statutes, and established regulations) covering data from 2010%u20132025, case law analysis (the legal doctrine of %u201cclear illegal orders%u201d), case-based structural analysis (schematically mapping the chain of command and command structure of major military incidents), and a comparative legal examination (the US Military Whistleblower Protection Act and the operation of the DoD Inspector General). The analysis revealed three key issues: (1) The gap between legal text and implementation creates the risk of legal criminalization within the organization, giving illegal orders a %u201clegal facade.%u201d (2) The decentralization of reporting channels, limitations in investigative independence, and insufficient prevention of retaliation reinforce organizational complicity. (3) Despite institutional provisions, whistleblower